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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EQUITABLE LIFE AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMP ANY, A Utah Corporation,
PUiintif f-A ppeUant,
vs.

INLAND PRINTING COMP ANY,
A Utah Corporation; D. KEITH
BARNES; WENDELL BARNES;
H. J. BARNES, Et Als.,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12255

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BARNESES

NATURE OF CASE
This is a mortgage foreclosure action against a corporate entity in which Plaintiff-Appellant also seeks to
recover a deficiency judgment against Directors of the
1
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Company on the grounds of their alleged negligent management of the corporate affairs.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff-Appellant's original Complaint was filed
on April 15, 1968, and named only Inland Printing
Company as Defendant in a mortgage foreclosure action.
On March 10, 1970, Plaintiff-Appellant filed an
Amended Complaint naming Defendants with conflicting lien priorities, officers and Respondent Barnes' as
Directors along with other Directors as Defendants. On
or about March 27, 1970 these Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Complaint moving the Court to: (I) dismiss the action because the Complaint fails to state a
claim against said Defendants upon which relief can be
granted; and, ( 2) dismiss the action against said Defendants upon the ground that they had been improperly . .joined as parties Defendant. An order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss was signed on May
28, 1970, which order provided that Plaintiff would
have Twenty (20) days from May 25, 1970 in which
to file another Amended Complaint. Plaintiff-Appel·
lant did file a second Amended Complaint dated June
10, 1970, and these Respondents again filed a motion to
dismis the Second Amended Complaint which motion
was dated July 23, 1970 and based upon the same
grounds as set forth in the first motion to dismiss.

2
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The Court heard oral arguments again on August
18, 1970, and signed an order of dismissal on August 24,
1970 without provision for filing another amended Complaint.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
These Respondents seek an affirmance of the District Court's order of dismissal dated August 24, 1970.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
During November, 1961, Defendant Inland Printing Company, a Utah Corporation, executed and delivered to Plaintiff certain promissory notes secured by
chattel and real property mortgages. These documents
were executed by Lloyd E. Anderson as "President and
Manager of the Corporation."
None of these documents was signed by any of the
Respondents nor do their names appear anywhere thereon nor did they make, execute or deliver any collateral
or associated documents in connection therewith.
On April 15, 1968 Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Complaint naming only Inland Printing Company, a Utah
Corporation, as Defendant which Complaint was in all

3
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respects strictly a mortgage foreclosure action. The
default of Inland Printing Company was entered on
May 2, 1968.
. Plaintiff-Appellant's original Attorney evidentiy
withdrew and new Counsel entered his appearance 011
M.arch 6, 1970, and moved the Court for an order settilig
aside the default of Defendant Inland Printing Company which order was granted.
That motion stated that it was " ... a foreclosure action against real and chattel property and that it is necessary that other parties be named in this action so that
all necessary parties can be given notice of this action.
. . ."The Order granting the Motion stated that Plaintiff had leave to file an Amended Complaint" ... naming
therein all necessary parties ...."
Plaintiff-Appellant filed its Amended Complaint
on March 10, 1970 which named defendants with conflicting lien priorities and also named Defendants-Respondents as new Defendants and claimed as damages
against them the amount of the deficiency judgment, if
any, on the foreclosure action and based such claim upon
their alleged "negligent" management of the corporate
affairs.
These Defendants-Respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint dated March 27, 1970 moving the
Court: " ( 1 ) to dismiss the action because the Compla~nt
fails to state a claim against said Defendants upon which
relief can be granted; and, ( 2) to dismiss the action

4
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against said Defendants upon the ground that they have
ueen improperly enjoined as parties-Defendant." This
Motion to Dismiss was granted and an Order entered
on May 28, 1970 which provided that Plaintiff-Appellant would have Twenty (20) days in which to file another Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff-Appellant filed its Second Amended
Complaint on or about June IO, 1970 and RespondentsDefendants filed a second motion to dismiss which was
based upon the same grounds and dated July 23, 1970.
The Court again heard oral arguments on the motion and granted said motion in favor of RespondentsDefendants and entered an Order to that effect dated
August 24, 1970.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT.
Appellant has spent the better part of its entire
brief with argument and citations of authority in support of legal axioms and principles whch have ne~er
been dsputed by Respondents and which are not d1s5
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puted
Respondents fully agree that when a mo t'10n
. now.
.
to d. ism1ss. a Complaint for "failure to state a claun· upon
which rehef can be ~r~nted" under Rule 12 (b) (6) of
the Utah Rules of C1v1l Procedure is filed, the material
allegations of the Complaint are to be taken as admitted·
however, conclusions of law and unwarranted deduction;
of fact are not admitted, Rasmussen vs. Sevier Valley
Canal Company, 40 U. 371, 121 P. 7 41; Gunnison Irr.
Co. vs. Peterson 74 U. 460, 280 P. 715; Hurst vs. Highway Department, 16 U. 2d 153, 397 P. 2d 71; Cessna Finance Corp. vs. Mesilla Valley Flying Service, Inc., 81
N.M. 10, 462 P. 2d 144; 2A Moore's Federal Practice
§ 12.08.
We are in agreement with the proposition that under the notice theory of pleading, the Complaint must
only give the opposing party fair notice of the nature
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. Respondents do
not claim that they did not have adequate notice and
knowledge of the nature of Appellant's claim as pleaded
in its First Amended Complaint and Second Amended
Complaint. Appellant fails to realize that we are not
concerned with the question of whether or not the pleadings afforded adequate notice of the nature of the claim.
The contention of Respondents, with which the lower
Court agreed in granting two separate Motions to Dis·
miss, is that under the law of the State of Utah as ap·
plied to the facts pleaded the Appellant has not made
out a claim for which any relief can be granted.
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In essence, Appellant has alleged that as a secured
creditor of the corporate entity it is entitled to recover
deficiency judgment on a mortgage foreclosure against
corporate directors for their negligent management of
the corporation.
It is the position and contention of Respondents
that corporate creditors cannot recover from directors of
the corporation any indebtedness incurred as a corporate
obligation on the grounds that such directors were negligent in managing the affairs of the corporate debtor.
Appellant attempts to controvert this position by
citing two cases, neither of which is in point. The facts in
each are totally dissimilar to the case at bar.
In Hoggan~ Hall~ Higgins, Inc. vs. Hall, 18 U.
2d. 3, 414 P. 2d. 89, cited by Appellant, this Court was
dealing with a situation wherein a corporate Plaintiff
brought suit against two former officers and stockholders who resigned and formed their own advertising
agency, upon the ground that they had tortuously violated their duty as officers and stockholders by soliciting
business for their planned advertising agency from
Plaintiff's customers while they were still officers and
stockholders of the Plaintiff corporation. Clearly, a suit
by a corporate entity against former officers and stockholders is clifferent both in law and in fact from the case
at bar.
In Sweeney vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 U. 2d ll3,
417 P. 2d 126, this Court was again dealing with a factual situation not relevant to the issues at bar. The situ-

7
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ation in that case was that Plaintiff and Defendant h d
f"d
·
a a
I uciary relationship in which they jointly contracted
for the development of some real estate in southeast Salt
La~e County. Plaintiff as beneficiary brought suit
aga~nst Defendant for an accounting. The rule which
Plamtiff refers to in the quote in its brief but which is
not quoted is set forth as follows, and is found at Page
129 Vol. 417 of the Pacific Reporter, Second Series:
. "We do not question the rule that when a fiduciary .deals for his own interest with the beneficiary, m case any question arises, such dealings
should be scrutinized with great care, and the
burden is upon him to show good faith in the
transaction. This rule applies in favor of the stockholders of a corporation as against its officers,
but it does not ordinarily extend to a creditor."
(I talics added.)
The Court went on to find that the trial Court was
justified in refusing to accept the Plaintiff's contention
of fiduciary responsibility to him and was, therefore,
correct in applying " ... the general rue that the burden
of proving fraud was upon the Plaintiff who asserted it."
It is, therefore, clearly evident that the Court would
apply the rule referred to above on behalf of creditors
only when there was proof of a fiduciary responsibility
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant and that it
would not do so otherwise. It may be argued inferenti·
ally that the Court in effect said that in the absence of a
fiduciary relationship between the creditor and the cor·
porate directors, the creditor must allege and carry the
burden of proving fraud against directors in order to re·
cover against them for corporate liabilities.

8
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In any event, it is clear that there is no fiduciary relationship between directors of a corporate moragagor
and a mortgagee debtor unless such directors agree to be
bound personally on the mortgage documents which they
did not do in this case. Respondents have found no authorities to support a proposition to the contrary and
Appellant, which has the burden of doing so, has cited
none.
Appellant has cited 19 AmJur 2d, Corporations§§
1276, 1336, both of which deal with the right of the corporate entity to bring action against its officers and directors, neither of which is applicable to the present situation. 19 AmJur 2d, Corporations§ 1341 cited by Appellant under a sub-chapter entitled "L. Rights and Liabilities as to Creditors or Third Persons I. Liabilities
for Corporate Acts, Debts or Contracts," states generally
in part:
"In most instances the directors or officers of a
corporation are not liable to its creditors or third
persons for corporate acts or debts. The directors
or officers of a corporation are not liable for corporate acts and debts simply by reason of their
official relation to the corporation; they are merely the agents of the corporation and on principal,
should no more be held liable therefor than any
other agent should be held liable for the acts and
debts of his principal."

* * * *

The law in support of Respondents' position is well
stated in 19 AmJur 2d, Corporations§ 1350 under a subchapter entitled "Liability for Mismanagement, Waste
or Diversion of Assets" as follows:

9
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"D~ectors or officers may be liable to the corporatw:i or stockholders for mismanagement of
the busmess of ~he corporation or waste of its assets; ~mt accor.dmg to .a number of cases, they arc
not liable to its creditors for mere mismanagement or waste of assets constituting a wrong or
breach of duty as to the corporation. The rule generally followed by the authorities is that a creditor .of a corporati?n may not maintain a personal
action at. law against the officers or directors of a
corporation who have, by their mismanagement
or negligence, committed a wrong against the corporation to the consequent damage of the creditor. The reason given for the rule is the entire
lack of privity between the parties. There is certainly no contractual relation between them, nor
any other legal relation which would raise a dutv,
on the part of directors or officers, to the credit;r
to exercise care in the management of the affairs
of the corporation. The duty to exercise diligence
and care is one owed to the corporation, and it is
elementary law that one person cannot maintain
an action against another for a wrong to a third
person which injures him only incidentally. However, there are other cases which seem to hold an
opinion contrary to the general proposition as ~x
pressed above. These actions seem to be mamtained upon the theory that directors are trustees
for creditors, but generally these cases have so1'.1c
element of fraud and deceit involved therem
Statutory provisions may permit actions by cre~ 1 tors against corporate officers in the cas~ of nm:
management, ~n? in a J?roper case, a creditor 1~a;.
maintain a smt m eqmty. Of course, a credit~
may have an action at law for fraud and deceit)
but such an action is based upon a wrong persona
to the creditor, and not a wrong consequent u~on
the breach of the duty owing to the corporatwn
10
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to manage its affairs and asseJs properly. (Italics
added.]
That was a statement of what Respondents have
contended all along, namely, that in the absence of any
allegations of fraud and deceit, creditors cannot maintain an action against corporate directors for their mismanagement of corporate affairs. That was the primary
basis of Respondents' first Motion to Dismiss and even
though Appellant's Second Amended Complaint was
substantially more prolix than the first, it was again unwilling or unable to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted and the Second Amended Complaint was also
dismissed.
An annotation entitled "Ribht of Creditor of Corporation to Maintain Personal Action Against Directors
or Officers for Mismanagement" found at 50 ALR 4.62
asks the question:
''Assuming such negligence or other breach of
duty on the part of the directors as would render
them personally liable at the suit of the corporation or anyone suing in its right, may a creditor
maintain a suit against them, not in the right of
the corporation, but in his own right, on the
theory that the ultimate consequence was a loss
. 2"
t o hrm.
After stating that cases dealing with claimants who
were fraudulently or deceitfully induced by directors to
extend credit to the corporation were not included in the
annotation, the question is answered as follows:
"'Vhile there is some confusion on the subject,
it may be stated, with some assurance, that a cred-

11
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ito~ of a corporati?n may not maintain a personal

action, a~ law, agamst the officers or directors of a
corpor~tion, who ha:e, by their mismanagemenl
or negligence, committed a wrong against the cor.
poration to the consequent damage of the creditor." (Citing cases.)

It has been held that the directors of a corporation
are responsible to the corporation, and not to its creditors
for breaches of duty in discharging their functions a~
corporate directors. Pritchard vs. Myers, 174 Md. 66,
197 A. 620, 116 ALR 775.
In the case of Inter-Ocean Casualty Company vs.
Leccony Smokeless Fuel Company, 123 W. Va. 541, 17
SE 2d 51, 137 ALR 488 the West Virginia Supreme
Court said:
"Moreover, the record here does not disclose
any active misfeasance on the part of Moran and
Jarett as officers and directors of the coal com·
pany. Certainly they received no benefit from the
failure of their corporation to account for and
pay over the amount of the premiums to the in·
surance company. In this state it is well settled
that the creditor of a monied corporation cannot
maintain an action at law against the directori
thereof for simply nonfeasance of duty to tI:e cor·
poration or fraud in its management or m1sman·
agement in the disposition of the money or pr~p·
erty of the corporation in the absenc~ a~ actii;c
intent to deceive or defraud the Plaintiff. [lta ·
ics added.)

of

* * * *

In Wesley Corporation vs. Blackburn, 107 ~V.
Va. 519, 149 SE 22, the Court said: 'The evasion

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

?f personal liability is~

co~on motive prompt-

mg person~ to engage m busmess through the instrumentality of a corporation.' And, by the same
token and reasoning, neither are the directors nor
officers liable in the absence of active wrongdoing." [Italics added.]

It has been stated that officers and directors of a
corporation are not liable to the corporate creditors, in
the absence of fraud, for negligence or mismanagement
of the company's business resulting in insolvency, unless
made so by charter or statute, neither of which is involved in the case at bar. United States Fidelity~ Guaranty Company vs. Corning State Saving Bank, 154 Iowa
588, 134 NW 857.

The position of Respondents is further supported in
3 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (perm. ed.)§ 1193 "Liability for
Debts in General" where it is stated:
"The directors or other officers of a corporation are not liable for debts contracted in t~.name
and on behalf of the corporation and ar~hicfi
binding upon it, unless they are expressly ma~e
liable by statute or unless they contract on their
own behalf. This is true notwithstanding the corporation is insolvent.'' (Citing cases.)

* * * *

The Order of dismissal should be affirmed for the
further reason that Appellant's action was a foreclosure
action and that these Respondents were not "necessary
parties" within the meaning of the Order of the Court
dated March 6 1970 allowing Appellant to add other
'
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parties Defendant who had conflicting lien interests for
the purpose of resolving lien priorities.

CONCLUSION
The order of dismissal entered by the Court below
should be affirmed on the grounds that: ( 1) Appellant's
Second Amended Complaint failed to state a claim
against Respondents upon which relief could be granted;
and, (2) Respondents were not properly joined as De·
fendants in the action.
Respectfully Submitted,
KING & KING
By: FELSHAW KING, Esquire
Attorneys for Defendants-Responden~
251 East 200 South
P. 0. Box 220
Clearfield, Utah 84015

Telephone: 825-2202
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